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ABSTRACT 
Coalition Politics and Accountability    
by Áron Kiss* 
The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical 
study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a 
problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held 
accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes 
problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power 
after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) 
cannot be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivize government 
performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, 
however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper 
analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Politische Koalitionen und Verantwortung 
In dieser Arbeit wird die theoretische Analyse der politischen Verantwortlichkeit 
auf die Situation einer Koalitionsregierung angewandt. Reduziert auf den 
vertragstheoretischen Kern des Problems stellen Koalitionsregierungen ein 
‘Teamprodukt’ für den Wähler als Prinzipal her, wobei der ‘Vertrag’ zwischen 
Wählern und Koalitionsregierung sehr spezifisch und jedenfalls unvollständig 
ist. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Disziplinierbarkeit einer Koalition unproblematisch 
ist, wenn eine wahre Wahlalternative vorhanden ist. Die Disziplinierbarkeit (also 
die politische Verantwortlichkeit) wird problematisch in einer Situation, in der 
sich eine Koalition verschiedener Parteien ergibt, zu der es keine echte 
mehrheitsfähige Alternative gibt, und die als ‘Große Koalition’ bezeichnet 
werden soll. Die Besonderheit der Großen Koalition ist, dass mindestens eine 
der beteiligten Parteien mit Sicherheit nach den nächsten Wahlen weiterregiert. 
Nur Teile der Regierung können abgewählt werden; die große Koalition als 
Einheit kann in dieser Situation von den Wählern nicht in toto ‘belohnt’ oder  
‘bestraft’ werden. Die Arbeit beschreibt die beste Strategie des repräsentativen  
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Wählers in einem stilisierten politischen System, in dem die ‘Große Koalition’ 
regiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass der Wähler den Regierungspolitikern nur dann 
Anreize setzen kann, wenn er eine der Regierungsparteien für die Regierungs-
politik verantwortlich macht. Dies führt jedoch zu einem Konflikt zwischen den 
Regierungsparteien, weil es die jeweils andere Regierungspartei zu Sabotage 
animiert. 
 
1 Introduction
Do coalition governments su¤er from an accountability decit? When do elections provide the right
incentives to coalition governments and when do they fail to do so? Are there situations when
reelection incentives induce a conict among government parties? These questions are addressed
in the present paper in a simple model of political accountability.
The accountability decit of coalition governments is a signicant, but often implicit, theoretical
hypothesis behind many empirical studies in public nance and political economics. In the study
of public debt, many explanations for why coalition governments may run higher budget decits
refer to ine¢ ciencies of coalition decision making. Such explanations include the collective action
problem (or common pool problem) in the spending of public funds, the lack of commitment
power of coalition partners, and the large number of veto players.1 These arguments, however, do
not take into account the inuence of elections on the actions of governments. If there is a high
probability that voters remove governments after poor outcomes, coalitions have an incentive to
solve the collective action problem.
The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government (a government that consists of
more than one decision maker) into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes
the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. Building on analyses by Barro
(1973), Ferejohn (1986) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 4), it concentrates on the moral-
hazard aspect of electoral politics. Voters can give incentives to government with the prospect
of reelection: they reelect the incumbent if government output is high enough. To assess the
accountability of coalition governments the question is asked: Do voters have to settle for a lower
government output if government consists of more than one decision maker?
Two main results emerge from the analysis. First, coalition government in itself does not ham-
per political accountability. Coalition governments can be given appropriate (collective) incentives
as long as, in the presence of an electoral alternative, the coalition as a whole can be voted out of
power. The reason is that reelection conditional on government performance works like a discrete
team bonus, the type of contract between the principal (voters) and the team of agents (coalition
government) that was shown by Holmstrom (1982) to solve the moral hazard problem in teams.
The second main nding is that the accountability of a coalition government becomes prob-
lematic when, in the absence of a real electoral alternative, the government cannot be removed
as a whole. In this case coalition parties cannot be given appropriate team incentives. To incen-
1These arguments have been put forward in the seminal work by Roubini and Sachs (1989). The robustness of
the weak government hypothesis, as they proposed it, is disputed by de Haan and Sturm (1997). Volkering and
de Haan (2001) nd a positive e¤ect of government fragmentation on debt and debt growth in OECD countries.
Ashworth et al. (2005) and Solé-Ollé (2006) nd supporting evidence for the hypothesis for Flemish and Spanish
municipalities, respectively, while the former provide a survey of the literature. Recent studies on the occurrence
and success of scal adjustments nd some, but unstable, e¤ect of coalition governments (see Mierau et al. 2007;
Illera and Mulas-Granados 2008).
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tivize government performance, voters have to make one of the coalition parties responsible for
the outcome. This creates incentives for the other party to reduce government performance (or
engage in sabotage). In this way, a conict emerges between the coalition parties, taking the
form of a socially costly contest. The resulting contest between the parties is most closely related
to a tournament with a handicapor head-start advantageanalyzed by Konrad (2002). As a
di¤erence to that paper, where the handicap is an exogenous e¤ect related to technology, here
it is endogenously determined by the votersstrategy. Accordingly, this paper characterizes the
optimal handicapas chosen by the voters. It is shown that voters can secure a positive expected
payo¤ even when facing this type of coalition. It is, however, as low as one-fourth of the payo¤
that voters can get in the presence of an electoral alternative.
The government form corresponding to this theoretical description is the unity governmentor,
as it is known in some countries, the Grand Coalition,a coalition including the major centre-left
and -right parties of a political system. In line with the theoretical analysis, unity government
can be dened as a situation where it is certain that (at least) one of the government parties stays
in power after the next election. Such governments played an important role in the recent political
history of Austria (1945-66, 1987-2000, 2007-), Germany (1966-69 and 2005-), Israel (1984-90 and
2001-03) and Italy (before 1991). In most of these cases the major centre-left and -right forces
formed a coalition because neither bloc achieved a majority in the presence of extremeor anti-
systemparties.2
Since coalition government is a characteristic government form of proportional electoral sys-
tems, the analysis has some, decidedly modest, normative implications for the study of proportional
representation (PR). According to the analysis the Achillesheel of PR is that the emergence of
extremeparties disrupts the alternation of governments, forcing the formation of a unity govern-
ment. A political system based on PR can thus benet from the moderation and accommodation
of extrememovements: it can preserve the possibility of alternating governments and, with that,
government accountability. While the analysis identies the benet, the potential costs of trusting
extrememovements with government responsibilities are also apparent, even if they may vary
from case to case. A successful process of moderation and accommodation happened in the case
of Communist parties in many European countries and, less controversially, in the case of Green
parties. Such an outcome cannot be seen in the case of the extreme right movements of Europe.
The analysis is not meant to decide the question of choice between electoral rules. Nonetheless,
it does provide a more satisfying theoretical argument about the possible weakness of coalition
governments (and perhaps of PR) than conventional references to the ine¢ ciencies of coalition
governments, since it takes into account the role of elections.
Beside the weak government hypothesis discussed above, the present paper is related to three
2See Geys et al. (2006) for a study of an extreme partys e¤ect on coalition formation in Belgian local elections.
For an overview of the theories and stylized facts of coalition government in the European context see the monograph
of Laver and Schoeld (1990).
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branches of literature in economics and political science. First, it intends to contribute to the
literature on political accountability by introducing coalition government into the eld of study.
The theoretical analysis of political accountability was initiated by the work of Barro (1973) and
Ferejohn (1986) as a study of moral hazard in electoral politics.3 While in most studies the
ability of voters to hold politicians accountable is welfare-improving, in recent papers, Maskin and
Tirole (2004) and Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) point out potential weaknesses of political
accountability. Most related to the present paper is the analysis by Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(1997) who, similarly to the present paper, also study the accountability of multiple decision
makers (politicians). In their framework, however, both decision makers are accountable separately
to the electorate, similarly to the president and the legislature in a presidential system. This
arrangement allows the authors to analyze the e¤ect of checks and balancesin a political system.
In our framework, the decision-makers are part of the same elected body, and therefore cannot
provide checks and balances against one another. For an overview of the issues related to political
accountability see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006).
Second, the analysis is related to several elds in the theory of incentives. The theory of
moral hazard in teams is relevant for the accountability of coalitions with electoral alternative.
Recent studies, following the seminal work of Holmstrom (1982), include Itoh (1991), Che und Yoo
(2001), and Battaglini (2006). The theory of all-pay auctions becomes relevant in the case where a
conict emerges between the parties of the unity government. This type of contest was thoroughly
analyzed by Hillman and Riley (1989), Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), and Baye, Kovenock and
de Vries (1996). As described above, the present paper extends work by Konrad (2002) on all-
pay auctions with a handicap or headstart advantage. Lazear (1989) provided an early and
inuential analysis of sabotage in contests. More recent analyses include Konrad (2000), Chen
(2003), and Münster (2007). Our setup di¤ers from these in that sabotage is not described as a
separate (second) instrument of the players, but rather as adverse e¤ort. The terminology is used
because this counter-e¤ort hurts government performance.
Last, the paper is related to the literature on retrospective (economic) voting. Developed from
an early debate within political science about voter motivation, the modern analysis of economic
voting concentrates on the e¤ect of macroeconomic outcomes on the popularity (or vote share) of
government.4 While the literature overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis that governments are
held responsible for economic outcomes, recent analyses emphasized the way political institutions
inuence this relationship. In widely cited paper, Powell and Whitten (1993) nd evidence for the
clarity-of-responsibility hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, governments are punished for
bad economic outcomes more severely if the assignment of responsibility for government policy is
3Beside the moral-hazard aspect, some analyses introduced an adverse-selection element to the analysis of political
accountability (see Banks and Sundaram 1993; Besley and Case 1995; Fearon 1999).
4Nannestad and Paldam (1994) provide a survey of the eld while the volume edited by Norpoth, Lewis-Beck
and Lafay (1991) gives account of many aspects of the literature in more detail.
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clearer; that is, in the absence of strong bicameral opposition, in the absence of a strong committee
system in the legislature and, particularly relevant in our context, in the case of one-party majority
government as opposed to coalitions. Complementary to this nding, Anderson (1995, Ch. 6)
nds in a comparative study of ve European democracies that economic conditions shift voter
support not only between government and opposition, but also among coalition partners. By
investigating theoretically the possibility of voters to reward or punish coalition governments, the
present paper intends to contribute to this literature.
The next section analyzes the accountability of a coalition government in the presence of an
electoral alternative. Section 3 turns to the case where political accountability is problematic: the
case of unity government. Section 4 concludes.
2 Accountability of electoral blocs
Consider an economy with an incumbent government L, an opponent R (whose role, as usual in
electoral accountability models, is perfectly passive) and a continuum of identical voters, repre-
sented by voter I. The incumbent government L consists of two decision makers (or factions), M
and N , thus it will be called an electoral bloc.
Each faction in the incumbent government chooses a (non-negative) e¤ort ei 2 <+, i 2 fM;Ng;
simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Voters can observe only the sum of e¤orts, e = eM + eN .
E¤ort is benecial for voters; their payo¤ w is given as w = e. After e becomes public, elections
are held, where the incumbent bloc L is facing an opponent R. Voters are indi¤erent between the
electoral blocs at the election stage.
The electoral bloc winning the election receives a rent of value v. If the incumbent bloc remains
in power, the factions share the rent according to exogenously given proportions i; i 2 fM;Ng
with i > 0 and
P
i = 1: Specically, the payo¤ of faction i, i = fM;Ng is given as
ui =
8<: iv   ei if L reelected ei else : (1)
At the beginning of the game, voters coordinate on a voting strategy. We consider the following
class of voter strategies: The representative voter I will vote for electoral bloc L if e > e; e 2 <+,
otherwise she will vote for bloc R: Thus, a strategy is given by the value of e. Such a strategy is
sometimes referred to as a simple retrospective voting rule(e.g., Persson et al. 1997).
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) The voters announce a voting strategy for reelecting
the incumbent electoral bloc. (2) The factions choose their respective e¤orts ei, i 2 fM;Ng. The
sum of e¤orts e is observed by the voters. (3) Elections take place. The newly elected government
earns the rents from o¢ ce and the game ends.
Since, at the election stage, voters are indi¤erent between the electoral blocs, it is weakly optimal
for them to follow their announced voting strategy, whatever it was. Therefore, it is reasonable to
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concentrate on subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE), where politicians expect voters to execute their
announced voting strategy, and voters indeed do so. This allows us to identify the SPE that are
optimal from the point of view of the voters, since their announcement is the rst move.5 In this
way, as Persson et al. (1997) point out, we analyze the potentialof electoral accountability in
di¤erent institutional settings, that is, in di¤erent constellations of coalition politics.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, voters reelect the incumbent electoral bloc L if and only if e > e;
e = v: The factions of the incumbent electoral bloc put forward an e¤ort ei = iv for i = fM;Ng;
so that e = e.
Proof. We solve the game backwards. Since voters are indi¤erent between the electoral blocs
at the election stage, it is (weakly) optimal for them to execute their announced voting strategy,
whatever that is. We can now turn to the e¤ort stage. Taking e¤ort ej ; j 2 fM;Ng as given,
faction i (i 2 fM;Ng; i 6= j) compares two relevant alternatives: exerting just enough e¤ort to
satisfy the voters or no e¤ort at all. Satisfying the voters is optimal if iv   (e   ej) > 0 which
is equivalent to the condition iv > e   ej : This expression is an incentive constraint: faction i
will not exert more e¤ort than iv to gain reelection. The sum of e¤orts can thus never exceed
v in equilibrium. If, however, voters set e = v, it is an equilibrium that factions set ei = iv,
i = fM;Ng, since their incentive constraints are just binding.
Proposition 1 shows that in a simple political accountability game, voters can extract the full
rent from the incumbent government, even if it consists of multiple decision makers (factions).
In other words, coalition governments can be held accountable. The result is closely related to
Theorem 2 of Holmstrom (1982). Elections provide here a particular type of contract (a discreet
team bonus) between the voter (principal) and the incumbent factions (agents). This is, however,
exactly the type of contract that solves the free-rider problem of teams in the analysis of Holmstrom.
The result does not depend on the number of factions that constitute the incumbent electoral
bloc. What is crucial, however, is the presence of an electoral alternative to the incumbent gov-
ernment. The ability to rewardor punishthe government as a whole allows the voters to give
appropriate team incentives to the incumbent factions.
3 Accountability of the unity government
As the analysis of the previous section shows, voters can always provide appropriate collective
incentives for the government as long as there is an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes
problematic if it is certain that (at least) one of the governing parties stays in power after the
5Other SPE can be supported by less plausible beliefs on the politiciansside. For instance, there exists a SPE
where politicians expect never to be reelected whatever the announced voting strategy was. Thus, they exert no
e¤ort. Since voters expect never to see positive e¤ort, they cannot do better than choosing strategy never reelect
the incumbent.
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elections, a description corresponding to the real-life government form that is often called a unity
governmentor, in other countries, a Grand Coalition. This case is modeled here as a situation
without opposition. The only thing voters can do is to choose between the government parties.6
Two further conditions are necessary for political accountability not to work in our framework.
The rst condition is that the e¤ort of the government parties cannot be disentangled by the voters.
They observe only the sum of e¤orts, that is, only one measure of government performance. This
condition would not hold in a framework where voters could assign the responsibility for every issue
(or, more generally, every action) to one of the coalition parties in the spirit of Laver and Shepsle
(1990). However, there are reasons why inseparability of responsibility is a plausible assumption
in our context. The rst reason is that the most prominent policy decisions require agreement
among coalition partners to pass legislation. Moreover, many outcomes of interest (like the state
of the economy in general or the level of government spending) are inuenced by many factors;
responsibility for them cannot be assigned to a single policy act or a single agent.
The second condition for accountability not to work is the possibility of sabotage, dened
here as costly e¤ort reducing government performance. Neither of these conditions represents
a departure from the framework presented in the analysis of electoral blocs. Clearly, none of
the factions had an incentive to engage in sabotage in that context. Further discussion of the
importance of these conditions is provided after the main results.
Consider an economy with two o¢ ce-motivated parties, L and R, both in government at the
beginning of the game. The parties choose e¤ort ei 2 <; i 2 fL;Rg simultaneously and non-
cooperatively. Negative e¤ort is possible, but is costly: the cost of e¤ort is equal to jeij. There is a
continuum of identical voters. The voters observe only the sum of e¤orts, e = eL+eR. The voters
utility w is given by w = e. After e becomes public, elections are held, where voters can choose
between the incumbent parties L and R. The representative voter I wants to induce a high e¤ort
by the government parties with her voting behavior, and is inherently indi¤erent between the two
parties at the election stage. The party that wins the election receives a rent of value vi; i 2 fL;Rg.
Note that in this case, parties may have di¤erent valuations of winning (equal valuations will be
discussed as a special case). Party is (i 2 fL;Rg) payo¤ is thus:
ui =
8<: vi   jeij if i elected  jeij else : (2)
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) The voters announce a voting strategy (see below).
6 In the formulation presented here, the unity government cannot be an outcome of the election. This inconsistency
can be remedied, without changing the qualitative results of the analysis, in a more complex voting game. Such
a voting game would involve an additional extreme party and a division of voters to partisanand swingvoters,
where swing voters decide the elections with a certain probability strictly between zero and one. Swing voters
would have the same strategy space as the voters in the present analysis; they would never consider to vote for the
extreme party. In such a world, the unity government is a possible outcome of the election, but the equilibria of the
accountability game would remain qualitatively unchanged. This extended voting game was described in an earlier
version of this paper and is available on request.
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(2) The parties choose their respective e¤orts ei; i = fL;Rg. The sum of e¤orts e is observed by
the voters. (3) Elections take place. The newly elected government earns the rents from o¢ ce and
the game ends.
We consider the following class of simple retrospective voter strategies: Representative voter
I will vote for party i, i 2 fL;Rg; if and only if e > e, e 2 <. Otherwise she will vote for party
j 2 fL;Rg; j 6= i. In this way, a strategy is given by a pair fi; eg. Note that the payo¤ of party
j is strictly monotonically decreasing in e¤ort. Beside the fact that e¤ort is costly, the higher
the government e¤ort the less probable that party j wins the elections. On the other hand, the
payo¤ of party i has a discrete positive jump in e¤ort (when ej is kept constant). Thus we can say
that voter strategy gives positive incentivesto party i and negative incentivesto party j. This
means that if sabotage (costly negative e¤ort) is possible, party j has an incentive to employ it.
Therefore, we expect ei > 0 and ej 6 0: To avoid confusion about the signs, let us dene sj   
ej > 0 as the (non-negative) sabotage of party j:
This game is structurally identical to a particular type of rst-price all-pay auction with the
two parties as bidders.The bidsare the e¤orts ei and sj . The cost of e¤ort cannot be recovered.
The representative voter plays the role of an auctioneer. The prizethe parties are ghting for
is the rent they receive in case of reelection. Party i wins the prize if and only if ei > e + sj .
The last expression entails a departure from the standard all-pay auction. By setting e; voters
can advantage one of the parties and handicap the other. A model with this structure, a class of
contests with a head-start advantage,has been analyzed by Konrad (2002). As a di¤erence to
that paper, the voters (auctioneers) problem plays a major role in our setting, as the head-start
advantagehere is not of technical, but rather of strategic, nature. (For this reason we will also
use the term handicapbeside threshold level of e¤ortto refer to e:) The objective of the voters
is also unusual. Since the e¤ort of one party benets the representative voter, but the e¤ort of
the other harms her, her objective will be to maximize the expected di¤erence in both e¤orts.
Formally, the votersproblem is
max
e
E(e); with E(e) = E(eL + eR) = E(ei   sj): (3)
To solve the game we apply the equilibrium selection criteria discussed in Section 2. The parties
expect voters to execute their announced voting strategy, and voters indeed do so, since it is weakly
optimal for them. Each point in the votersstrategy space implements an all-pay auction with a
handicap. The voters choose optimally from a restricted set of strategies.
Two points are worth noting about the equilibrium. First, although one party exerts positive
e¤ort and the other exerts negative e¤ort (sabotage), the voters do not want to punish the
saboteur. Voters know that party behavior is induced by the voters electoral strategy; that
strategy in turn is designed to maximize voters expected payo¤. Ultimately, the emergence of
sabotage is the price voters have to pay for being able to give incentives at all; to avoid sabotage,
they would have to renounce from any incentive e¤ect (e.g., by not making their voting behavior
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conditional on government performance). It would also mean that they earn a zero payo¤ with
certainty.
Second, voters can choose which party they make responsible for the governments performance.
Choosing optimally, as we will see, voters will give positive incentives to the party with the higher
valuation (and choose an appropriate performance threshold). The fact that voters can choose
which party to make responsible for the outcome may seem unrealistic in the context of the
application. In a real-life example, it could be that the prime ministers party is automatically
viewed as being responsible for the outcome. But in that case the coalition partner will have an
incentive for sabotage; and the resulting equilibrium would have the same structure as described
here. In summary, both of these aspects might be unrealistic in the context of the real-world
political application. But replacing them with more realistic assumptions would not alleviate the
accountability problem of the unity government; if anything it would make it worse by restricting
the votersset of possible strategies.
Proposition 2 Let us assume, without loss of generality, that vR > vL: In equilibrium, voters
give their vote to party R if e > e; and L otherwise; the optimally chosen reservation utility is
e = maxf vRvLvR+vL ; vR   vLg:
Further, parties choose mixed strategies to determine their e¤ort levels:
(i) If vRvLvR+vL > vR   vL; then the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of the e¤ort subgame is
described by following cumulative distribution functions:
HL(sL) =
8>>><>>>:
0 for sL < 0
e
vR
+ sLvR for 0 6 sL 6 vR   e
1 for sL > vR   e
(4)
HR(eR) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 for eR < 0
e (vR vL)
vL
for 0 6 eR < e
[1  vRvL ] + eRvL for e 6 eR 6 vR
1 for eR > vR
: (5)
(ii) If vRvLvR+vL 6 vR   vL; then the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of the e¤ort subgame is
described by following cumulative distribution functions:
HL(sL) =
8>>><>>>:
0 for sL < 0
[1  vLvR ] + sLvR for 0 6 sL 6 vL
1 for sL > vL
(6)
HR(eR) =
8>>><>>>:
0 for eR < e
eR
vL
  evL for e 6 eR 6 vL + e
1 for eR > vL + e
: (7)
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Proof. See the Appendix.
For the case where vR = vL = v; the limit of the Proposition can be applied. The voters can
choose arbitrarily to which of both parties they give positive incentives. The condition of case (i)
is fullled, thus the optimally chosen threshold level of e¤ort (or handicap) is e = v2 :
The following example may give an intuition for Proposition 2. Let us assume that vR > vL:
We will solve for the equilibrium party behavior for the case when voters in the rst stage chose a
retrospective voting strategy described by the pair fR; eg with e > vR vL: Voters in this example
choose to give party R positive incentives and vote for it if e > e and for party L otherwise.
We can write the expected payo¤s of the parties as follows: uR = Pr(eR > e+ sL)vR   eR and
uL = [1   Pr(eR > e + sL)]vL   sL: As it is established in the analysis of all-pay auctions, this
type of game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. We will follow the literature to nd the mixed
strategy equilibrium.7
First, no party will choose a bid(that is, e¤ort or sabotage) that is higher than its valuation,
since such a choice gives a negative payo¤ with certainty. Also, no party will bid below zero, since
such a bid is costly and reduces the partys chances of winning compared to bidding zero. Party
R thus loses with certainty for any bid eR < e; since such a bid loses against the smallest possible
bid of the opponent, sL = 0: Therefore, R will not put forward any positive bid below e. On the
other hand, party L can secure the prize with a bid of sL = vR   e; earning a secure payo¤ of
vL   vR + e: (This payo¤ is positive, since we are considering the case where e > vR   vL:) Thus
we expect that R will randomize on the interval [e; vR]; earning zero in expectation and that L will
randomize over [0; vR  e] earning an expected payo¤ of vL  vR+ e. In this case, the handicape
is large enough to turn around the rankingof the players, letting the originally strongerplayer
become the weakerone.
As all actions that a player randomizes over have to give the same expected payo¤, we can
reach the following equation for party Ls actions sL.
HR(sL + e)vL   sL = vL   vR + e (8)
From this we can solve for HR(eR); the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Rs bids. Since
the previous equation has to hold for any sL 2 [0; vR   e]; the following equation has to hold for
any eR = sL + e; eR 2 [e; vR] :
HR(eR) = [1  vR
vL
] +
eR
vL
: (9)
Note that Rs bid distribution function has a mass point on zero (since we know he will not bid
between zero and e). Similarly, the equation that describes the expected payo¤ of Rs actions,
HL(eR   e)vR   eR = 0; helps us nd the solution for Ls bid distribution function HL(sL) for
sL 2 [0; vR   e]:
HL(sL) =
e
vR
+
sL
vR
(10)
7See, for example, Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, Section 10.1.2) and Konrad (2002). The uniqueness of this
equilibrium can be shown analogously to the uniqueness proof of Baye et al. (1996).
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Figure 1: Density functions of party e¤ort in mixed-strategy equilibrium. (Mass points on zero
not displayed.)
Thus Ls bid function also has a mass point on zero. The bid distributions constitute an equilib-
rium, since they were constructed so. Further, the distribution functions allow us to calculate the
expected payo¤ of the voters in equilibrium.
Figure 1, depicting the density functions of party e¤ort and sabotage, gives an intuition about
the trade-o¤ the voters are facing. A higher handicap e reduces Rs expected e¤ort because it
raises the threshold below which R does not bid. In e¤ect, the lowest bids of R are turned to
zero-bids and the rest is unchanged. At the same time, a higher handicap e reduces Ls expected
sabotage as well; but it is the highest-sabotage bids that are removed. Starting from e = vR   vL
as a reference point, a small increase in the reservation utility reduces expected sabotage more
than expected e¤ort, as long as vR  vL is small enough. Thus, in that case, the optimal handicap
is expected to more than compensate for the di¤erence in valuations between the parties. In other
words, if the party with the higher valuation is given positive incentives, it will at the same time
be severely handicapped in the votersoptimum.
From Proposition 2 we can calculate voterspayo¤ as
wI =
8<:
v3R
2vL(vR+vL)
if e = vRvLvR+vL > vR   vL
(vR vL)(vL+2vR)
2vR
if e = vR   vL > vRvLvR+vL
The rst line simplies to wI = v4 if vR = vL = v: Thus, voters get a positive expected payo¤ even
facing a unity government and the possibility of sabotage. Voter payo¤ is, however, dramatically
reduced as compared to the case when an opposition is present. (There, as we saw, voters can
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receive the full rent v.) This is true because the positive e¤ort of the one party is lower than
valuation v with probability 1, while the other party engages in sabotage activity.
It remains to discuss the importance of the two assumptions mentioned above: the possibility
of sabotage and the non-observability of individual party e¤ort. It is easy to see that, if sabotage
is not possible, voters could give positive incentives to the party with the higher valuation without
inducing outright conict. In that case, again, full rent can be extracted from the party. If, on
the other hand, the e¤ort of each party were observed, voters would have no reason to condition
their voting strategy on the sum of e¤orts. Instead, they could induce a benecialtournament
announcing that the party with the higher e¤ort will gain their support.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the political accountability of coalitions as a problem of moral hazard in
teams. It is shown that a coalition government can be held accountable as long as there is an
electoral alternative. Voters can always threaten not to reelect the government, which gives the
appropriate team incentives to the government.
The accountability of coalition governments becomes problematic if the voters have no electoral
alternative. In this case it is certain that (at least) one of the incumbent parties remain in power
after the next election. Voters cannot give appropriate team incentives to the government, but
only choose between the incumbent parties. It was shown that even in this situation, voters can
induce a positive expected government performance by making one coalition party responsible for
the outcome. This voting strategy creates a conict among the government parties, making one
party interested in reducing government output. The paper solves for the optimal strategy of the
voters as designersof the resulting contest between the government parties.
The theoretical description of a coalition government with no electoral alternative corresponds
to the real-life examples of unity governmentor, as it is known in some countries, Grand Coali-
tion. Such coalitions of the main centre-left and centre-right parties typically form in political
systems with Proportional Representation (PR) in the presence of extreme parties. Thus, the
analysis points at a specic source of accountability decit in PR systems.
The analysis also provides a counter-argument to notions of coalition ine¢ ciencyoften cited
in empirical analyses. Such arguments do not take into account the role of elections. Even if
coalitions do face collective action problems, they also have an incentive to overcome them if their
reelection probability decreases after ine¢ cient outcomes. The possibility of (no) reelection gives
the politicians incentives to act in the citizensinterest.
As an implication for empirical research, it appears that the number of parties included in
a government coalition (the variable universally used in empirical work to control for blurred
responsibility) may not be the most informative variable. The political constellation in which a
(coalition) government operates should play a crucial role. Specically, it could be useful to identify
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the weight of extreme parties in the legislature, since this shows ultimately whether there is a real
electoral alternative to the government. Information on the electoral margin of government may
also indicate the presence of a unity government.
This study did not consider aspects of coalition formation and breakup. The inclusion of
this aspect would, however, not a¤ect our results. If, for example, a political faction leaves an
electoral bloc, voters have still no incentive to change their strategy in the elections: voting for the
incumbent bloc after good outcomes and for the opposition after bad ones. Similarly, an additional
coalition formation stage at the beginning of the game would not a¤ect the main driving forces
of the analysis: once a governing coalition is in place, the actions of coalition partners are shaped
solely by the incentives that voters give them.
A possible path of future research is to analyze the problems of coalition government and polit-
ical accountability in a more detailed public nance framework. This could allow us to introduce
more explanatory factors to analyze the question under what circumstances the common pool
e¤ect is (un)likely to emerge in coalition governments.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We assumed, without loss of generality, that vR > vL: We can divide the representative voter Is
strategy space i; e 2 R;L< into six ranges. These di¤er along two dimensions: 1) whether the
voters give positive incentives to the party with the higher valuation (whether i = R) or to the
party with the lower valuation (i = L); and 2) in which of three intervals the reservation utility e
is chosen. The reason for separating exactly these ranges is that the resulting all-pay auction has
a di¤erent mixed-strategy equilibrium in each of them. In each strategy range we rst characterize
equilibrium party behavior for a given e and search for the voters optimal choice of e within the
given range: Then we will be able to make a global statement about I 0s optimal strategy.
Range 1: Give positive incentives to the party with the higher valuation and
handicap it slightly. Suppose voter Is strategy is given by the pair fR; eg with vR vL > e > 0.
The c.d.f. of the partiesequilibrium bid functions are as follows (to save space, we will suppress
intervals where the c.d.f. of the bid functions is 0 or 1):
HL(sL) = [1  vL
vR
] +
sL
vR
for 0 6 sL 6 vL (11)
HR(eR) =
eR
vL
  e
vL
for e 6 eR 6 vL + e (12)
To check that this constitutes an equilibrium, note that L has a negative payo¤ for all bids below
0 or above his valuation vL. For any bid sL between these values Ls payo¤ is HR(sL + e)vL   sL
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which is equal to zero given the supposed form of HR: On the other hand, the payo¤ of R for any
bid eR between e and vL+ e is HL(eR  e)vR  eR which, given the supposed form of HL; is equal
to vR  vL  e: It is easy to see that any bid outside this range gives an inferior payo¤. Uniqueness
of this equilibrium can be shown along the lines of Baye et al. (1996).
The representative voter, seeking to choose the best e in the relevant interval vR   vL > e > 0;
wants to maximize e = eR   sL: She notes that her choice does not a¤ect Ls optimal strategy,
but that a higher e translates one-to-one to higher e¤ort eR (in a stochastic sense). Therefore the
voters best option is to choose the upper limit of this interval, that is, e = vR   vL: Her expected
payo¤ is then
E[eR   sL] = v
2
L(vR   vL)
2vRvL
+ e =
(vR   vL)(vL + 2vR)
2vR
> 0: (13)
Range 2: Give positive incentives to the party with the higher valuation while
handicapping it strongly. Suppose voter Is strategy is given by the pair fR; eg with e >
vR   vL > 0: Then, the c.d.f. of the partiesequilibrium bid functions (identical to the example in
the main text) are given by:
HL(sL) =
e
vR
+
sL
vR
for 0 6 sL 6 vR   e (14)
HR(eR) =
8<:
e (vR vL)
vL
for 0 6 eR < e
[1  vRvL ] + eRvL for e 6 eR 6 vR
(15)
Following the same steps as in Range 1, it can be shown that this constitutes an equilibrium.
Now we can turn to the votersproblem.
max
e
E[eR   sL] s:t: e > vR   vL > 0: (16)
E[eR   sL] = E[eR]  E[sL] =
Z vR
e
eRhR(eR)deR  
Z vR e
0
sLhL(sL)dsL: (17)
Here, the rst equation comes from the fact that the parties randomize independently from one
another, the second uses the usual denition of the expected value of a continuous variable, where
mass points at zero can be suppressed. Note that the bid densities are constant on the relevant
intervals. Now it is easy to evaluate the integrals to get
E[eR   sL] = v
2
R(vR   vL)
2vRvL
+ e  vR + vL
2vRvL
e2: (18)
We get the rst-order condition by di¤erentiating this last expression with respect to e and
equating the result to zero. This gives us e = vRvLvR+vL :The second-order condition is clearly fullled.
But we have to make sure that the optimum lies in the considered range e > vR   vL. This is
the case if vR 6 1+
p
5
2 vL: For vR >
1+
p
5
2 vL we have a corner solution e = vR   vL > vRvLvR+vL . To
summarize, in this range, voter Is optimal choice for the handicape is given by
e = maxf vRvL
vR + vL
; vR   vLg: (19)
13
Range 3: Give positive incentives to the party with the higher valuation and
give it a head-start advantage. Suppose voter Is strategy is given by the pair fR; eg with
vR   vL > 0 > e. The equilibrium bid functions are
HL(sL) =
8<: vR vL evR for 0 6 sL <  e[1  vLvR ] + sLvR for   e 6 sL 6 vL (20)
HR(eR) =
eR
vL
  e
vL
for 0 6 eR < vL   e (21)
The objective function of the voter is
E[eR   sL] = v
2
L(vR   vL)
2vRvL
+ e+
vR + vL
2vRvL
e2: (22)
This expression describes a convex parabola. On the one end of the relevant range, at e = 0;
the pay-o¤ is positive, then it decreases below zero as e decreases only to start to rise again,
reaching zero at e =  vL: For higher performance thresholds voter payo¤ is constant zero, since
the outcome of the game is trivial: no party exerts e¤ort as L cannot win. Thus, the optimal
head-start advantagein this range is e = 0:
Range 4: Give positive incentives to the party with the lower valuation and give
it a slight head-start advantage. Suppose voter Is strategy is given by the pair fL; eg with
vL   vR 6 e 6 0. Then, the equilibrium bid functions resemble those found in Range 1 (Read  e
for e; exchange si for ei and vice versa). Also, just as in Range 1, party Ls optimal strategy is
not a¤ected by the choice of handicap. Voter payo¤ is
E[eL   sR] = v
2
L(vL   vR)
2vRvL
+ e: (23)
This expression is monotone increasing in e, so the optimal choice is given by the upper corner
e = 0. Note that voter payo¤ is negative at this point.
Range 5: Give positive incentives to the party with the lower valuation and give it
a signicant head-start advantage. Suppose voter Is strategy is given by the pair fL; eg with
e 6 vL   vR 6 0. The equilibrium bid functions resemble those found in Range 2. The objective
function of the voters is
E[eL   sR] = v
2
R(vL   vR)
2vRvL
+ e+
vR + vL
2vRvL
e2: (24)
This is another case where the objective is a convex parabola. Possibilities for the optimum
are e = vL   vR and e =  vR: Calculating the payo¤ for e = vL   vR, we nd a negative payo¤
E[eL   sR] = (vL   vR)(vL + 2vR)
2vR
< 0: (25)
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At the same time, e =  vR (and any choice below that) implements a trivial auction where bids
equal zero and L always wins. This option delivers zero payo¤ to I and is therefore optimal within
this range.
Range 6: Give positive incentives to the party with the lower valuation and hand-
icap it. Suppose voter Is strategy is given by the pair fL; eg with vL   vR 6 0 6 e. The bid
functions resemble those in found in Range 3. The expected payo¤ of the voters is
E[eL   sR] = v
2
L(vL   vR)
2vRvL
+ e  vR + vL
2vRvL
e2: (26)
Note that this objective is identical to the one found in Range 2 up to the constant. (Note
also that the constant here is negative while it is positive for Range 2.) Therefore, the optimal
handicap is the same as there, e = vRvLvR+vL (here unconstrained). The voters payo¤ is compared
below.
The global optimum. After calculating the optimum in each of these ranges we are to rank
these (restricted) optima. We will show that the Range-2-optimum represents a global optimum,
which proves the Proposition.
First note that Ranges 4 and 5 cannot produce a positive payo¤ to I; they are thus strictly
inferior to Range 1.
Second, note that all strategy ranges are dened such as to include interval limits. This is useful
because Range 3 has a corner solution which is an available option in adjacent Range 1. Similarly,
Range 1 exhibits a corner solution which is an available option in adjacent Range 2. Therefore,
the optimal strategy in Range 2 represents the optimum over Ranges 1, 2, and 3, 4 and 5.
The last step is to show that the optimal strategy in Range 2 is superior to that in Range 6.
Here we have to distinguish to cases.
Case A: vL < vR 6 1+
p
5
2 vL: Here the optimum in Range 2 is e =
vRvL
vR+vL
just as in Range 6.
We have noted that voter Is objective di¤ers across the two ranges only by a constant. Evaluated
at the same reservation utility e, voter I 0s payo¤ is strictly higher in Range 2.
Case B: vR > 1+
p
5
2 vL; or, equivalently, vR   vL > vRvLvR+vL . Here, in Range 2 we have a corner
solution at e = vR   vL giving a payo¤ of (vR vL)(vL+2vR)2vR to I. We can express Is payo¤ at the
optimum in Range 6 as
v3L
2vR(vR + vL)
=
vRvL
vR + vL
v2L
2v2R
< (vR   vL) v
2
L
2v2R
; (27)
where we used Case Bs dening inequality. To show that the optimum in Range 6 is inferior to
the one of Range 2, we need
(vR   vL)v2L
2v2R
<
(vR   vL)(vL + 2vR)
2vR
; (28)
which is fullled as
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v2L
2v2R
<
1
2
< 1 <
(vL + 2vR)
2vR
: (29)
This completes the proof.
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